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A JUST WAR INQUIRY OF POLICE, 
PROSECUTORS & DEADLY FORCE 
 
RYAN GEISSER 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement is authorized to use deadly force under limited 
circumstances in the United States. Most do not dispute that there are some 
clear cases when the use of deadly force is warranted, such as when a person 
runs at police with a knife and swears they intend to kill the officer. The 
more controversial issues arise when attempting to articulate the limits on 
when lethal force is justified. While theorists and academics can 
contemplate how police officers should act in the abstract, law enforcement 
does not have the same luxury when they are out on patrol and their lives 
are in constant jeopardy. Oliver Wendell Holmes said it best when he 
proclaimed “[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of 
an uplifted knife.”1 
The present analysis will attempt to create a clear framework for 
determining when law enforcement are justified in using lethal force, 
applying just war theory to bridge the difference between theoretical 
approaches and the reality of police officers faced with a split-second 
decision. This inquiry will not begin from a legalist paradigm, but a moral 
one. Once a robust descriptive account of the current state of the law is 
developed, the principles of just war theory will be used as a framework to 
provide compelling normative responses to two questions. First, when is a 
police officer justified in using deadly force on a fleeing felon? Second, 
what is required of prosecutors who make the decision not to seek 
indictment of a police officer who used deadly force? This article advocates 
for a nationwide implementation of what I refer to as the “California 
Model”2, a rigorous and transparent protocol for determining whether a 
 
 
 J.D. Candidate (2018), Washington University School of Law 
1 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
2 While referred to as the “California Model," the practice of publishing “declination reports” in 
cases where the County declines to prosecute an officer who used deadly force is only a confirmed 
practice of four offices: the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office (“LADA”), San Diego 
County District Attorney’s Office (“SDCDA”), Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office 
(“SCCDA”), and Orange County District Attorney’s Office (“OCDA”). Though it is possible other state 
prosecuting agencies regularly publish declination reports, as of October of 2017 at least fourteen other 
District Attorney’s Offices across the country either publish no declination reports at all, or at a minimum 
do not make their reports even remotely as accessible as LADA, SDDA, and SCDA. 
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prosecuting agency will initiate criminal proceedings against a police 
officer that used deadly force and publicizing the rationale for that decision. 
The goal of this analysis is not to articulate a complete statutory 
scheme encompassing all circumstances under which a law enforcement 
officer is justified in using deadly force. Instead, the analysis will proceed 
in two steps: first, demonstrating the applicability of the just war tradition 
to the law governing use of deadly force by law enforcement, particularly 
in the context of the “fleeing felon,” and second, drawing on just war 
principles to evaluate how prosecutorial agencies should proceed after a 
police officer has used deadly force.  
There is no shortage of arguments on both sides of an officer’s decision 
to use deadly force Yet there is surprisingly little written about what should 
happen after a deadly force incident occurs. Obviously, if the prosecuting 
agency determines that the use of deadly force was not justified in a given 
instance, and there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the officer’s use of deadly force was unlawful, the right course of 
conduct is to initiate criminal proceedings against the officer involved. 
However, the question of what prosecuting agencies should do when the 
killing was lawful, or when there is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the use of deadly force was not unlawful, remains 
unanswered. A simple response is that the prosecutorial agency will not 
initiate criminal proceedings against the officer. But whether this is all a 
prosecuting agency should do remains unresolved.  
This absence of analysis regarding what should happen after an armed 
conflict has occurred is mirrored in the just war tradition. There, the bulk of 
academia focuses on the decision to wage war, jus ad bellum, and just 
conduct within war, jus in bello. But there is surprisingly little written about 
the just termination of a war, jus post bellum.  Drawing on the parallel ideas 
of and scholarship of just war theory, this article will consider what law 
enforcement agencies should do as they move to wrap up an armed conflict 
involving police officers.3  
 There are two paradigms that justify lethal force: the war paradigm and 
the law enforcement paradigm. The principles of just war theory are 
particularly applicable to the context of law enforcement use of deadly force 
because it provides a reasonable premise from which to begin: a peace 
officer should not be justified in the use of deadly force where a soldier of 
war is not. The purpose justifying deadly force in the domestic sphere 
 
 
3 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS (REV, Basic Books 2006). 
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should likewise parallel the purpose justifying armed conflict in the 
international sphere.    
In the international realm, the aim of a just war is to attain a more 
secure and more just state of affairs than existed prior to the war.4  Applying 
the concept to the domestic realm, the just aim of police use of deadly force 
is to attain a more secure and more just state of affairs than existed prior to 
the officer’s decision to discharge his weapon. The purpose of the present 
anlaysis is to defend the following proposition: the mere exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion of whether to bring an indictment against a public 
officer for violating a state’s law governing use of deadly force in the line 
of duty fails to achieve the goal for which the force was used. When a 
prosecuting agency decides not to bring an indictment, in order to attain a 
more secure and more just state of affairs than existed prior to the police 
officer’s use of deadly force, it is necessary for an objective independent 
body to publicly release its reasoning for not initiating criminal proceedings 
against the officer.  
The practice of publically releasing reasons for not initiating criminal 
proceedings realizes the goals of just war by restoring trust and providing 
legitimacy to the entire law enforcement apparatus. It serves this purpose 
effectively for three reasons: (1) it promotes transparency; (2) it improves 
accountability, both of prosecutors and legislators; and (3) publishing a 
declination report in this context creates a political check on the 
prosecutor’s power not to charge. 
 Part I will briefly cover the history of law enforcement and its function. 
This will include an examination of how police officers are trained in 
contemporary America. Examination of the function of police officers will 
demonstrate why law enforcement officers, both police and prosecutors, are 
properly analyzed through the just war framework.   After the normative 
underpinnings of the law enforcement apparatus are adequately developed, 
Part II surveys the prevailing law governing the use of deadly force by law 
enforcement to apprehend fleeing persons suspected of committing a felony 
(“fleeing felons”). This encompasses the constitutional analysis of deadly 
force, as well as state criminal law regulating the same issue. Part III will 
conclude with a brief survey of the criticisms and defenses of the current 
state of the law governing the use of deadly force by law enforcement, both 
in theory and in practice. 
 Part III introduces just war theory, and the three sets of rules that 
compromise the just war tradition. These include jus ad bellum, jus in bello, 
 
 
4 Brian Orend, Justice After War, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 43, 45 (2002). 
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and jus post bellum. This section of the article demonstrates why the 
principles of just war theory are uniquely applicable to the use of deadly 
force by public officers, and the value of drawing on the just war tradition 
to examine the many controversies that arise when a police officer kills in 
the line of duty. Missouri’s law governing deadly force to apprehend a 
fleeing felon will be evaluated at the end of Part III using the jus in bello 
principles of discrimination, proportionality, and minimum necessity. This 
will demonstrate how these principles are in large part already reflected in 
the statutes governing deadly force by public officials.  
 After demonstrating the applicability of the just war tradition to the law 
governing police officer use of deadly force, Part IV will address the second 
objective of this article: to evaluate how prosecutorial agencies should 
proceed after a public officer uses deadly force. This requires constructing 
a general set of principles to guide communities seeking to resolve their 
armed conflicts fairly. This section of the article will introduce the the 
“California Model” used by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 
Office (LADA) following a law enforcement officer’s use of deadly force. 
Under this model, when LADA prosecutors decide not to seek indictment 
of the officer involved, the agency publishes a declination report explaining 
the reasons why initiating criminal proceedings is not warranted for this 
particular instance. This section will conclude by illustrating the California 
Model through an in-depth examination of one officer-involved shooting 
where LADA elected not to seek an indictment of the officer.  
Part V will critically assess the strengths of the California Model and 
ways in which this model might be improved. The analysis concludes that 
the California Model promotes transparency, increases accountability, and 
functions as a much needed political check on the prosecutor’s power not to 
charge. As such, LADA’s approach should be implemented nationwide to 
restore faith in the legitimacy of the law enforcement apparatus.  
I. HISTORY AND TRAINING OF POLICE OFFICERS 
In the early American colonies, policing was informal and largely left 
to volunteer community members.5  The transformation toward modern 
centralized municipal police departments began in the nineteenth century, 
when the British Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 created one of the first 
 
 
5 Dr. Gary Potter, The History of Policing in the United States, Part 1, EASTERN KENTUCKY 
UNIVERISTY: POLICE STUDIES ONLINE, available at  http://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-
policing-united-states-part-1.  
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formal, uniformed, paid, civil-service police forces in England.6 In America, 
states quickly followed suit, creating their own police forces modeled after 
the British system.7 
Today, nearly every city and town has a professional police force. With 
this institutionalization and professionalization of the police force has come 
more extensive and standardized training. However, this training is heavily 
tilted toward tactics for responding to violence with force, at the expense of 
training in nonviolent de-escalation tactics. A Police Executive Research 
Forum survey of 281 police agencies found that while the median time for 
police firearm training is 58 hours and the median time for defensive tactics 
is 49 hours, the median time spent on de-escalation and crisis intervention 
is just 8 hours each, with many departments providing no training in either.8 
This focus may be misguided. One former police officer describes de-
escalation as a literal lifesaver, giving voice to a popular sentiment among 
critics of the frequency with which police officers resort to deadly force. 
“[P]olice officials, as well as critics of the police, are asking a very 
reasonable question about why their cops all too often rush to judgment, 
initiating physical confrontations or firing their weapons, when far safer 
outcomes could be achieved by slowing things down, sizing up situations, 
and calming tensions.”9 
Of course, law enforcement officers rarely have the luxury of time 
to deescalate a potentially violent situation. According to experts, a police 
officer has approximately half a second to pull a weapon when confronted 
with someone perceived as dangerous and about to inflict harm.10 “Studies 
show that it takes a quarter of a second for an officer to recognize a threat, 
such as when a person is reaching for a gun, and another quarter-second for 
that officer to draw his gun. It takes another .06 seconds to pull the 
trigger.”11 One of the challenges police academies inevitably must face is 
training new recruits for situations where there is no time to reflect, and only 
time to react. Recruits are trained early on to recognize and react to a 
 
 
6 NORM STAMPER, TO PROTECT AND SERVE: HOW TO FIX AMERICA’S POLICE (Nation Books, 
2016), at 22-23. 
7 Stamper, supra note 6, at 23. Boston enacted its police force in 1838, New York in 1845, 
Philadelphia in 1854, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department in 1846, Los Angeles PD in 1869. 
8 Ryan J. Reilly, Police Group Makes A Big Admission About ‘Justifiable’ Police Shootings, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-shootings-police-
executive-research-forum_us_55d4f4ede4b07addcb456c76. 
9 Stamper, supra note 6, at 59. 
10 Debbi Baker, How Police Are Trained In Deadly Force, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, (Aug. 
24, 2014) http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/crime-courts-fire/sdut-police-deadly-force-
training-academy-ferguson-2014aug23-story.html. 
11 Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
64        WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW         [VOL. 10:59 
 
 
 
 
movement that looks like a gun being drawn.12 They are also trained to 
constantly scan their surroundings, processing all the information as they 
approach a potentially lethal exchange. However, police say “it is the 
suspect who dictates what happens, whether he or she follows the officer’s 
commands or actively resists.”13 This is particularly significant in the 
context of the present analysis, examining those situations in which a fleeing 
felon actively resists the officer’s commands. 
II. DEADLY FORCE TO APPREHEND FLEEING FELON  
A. Constitutional Law 
The Supreme Court addressed police use of deadly force in the 
landmark decision Tennessee v. Garner.14 In Garner, police were called to 
investigate a “prowler inside” call.15 When they arrived, a homeowner 
reported that a break-in was underway at the neighboring house.16 As the 
police officer began to investigate, he heard a door slam and saw someone 
run across the backyard of the house.17 The fleeing suspect, Edward Garner, 
stopped at the edge of the backyard, where a 6-foot-high chain link fence 
obstructed his path.18 The officer later testified he saw no signs indicating 
Garner possessed a weapon, and was “reasonably sure” and “figured” that 
Garner was unarmed.19 The officer called out to Garner to halt; Garner 
proceeded to climb the fence. Convinced that if Garner succeeded in 
climbing over the fence he would evade capture, the police officer shot 
him.20 Garner died later that evening.21 Ten dollars and a purse taken from 
the house were found on Garner. He was 17 or 18 years old.22  
 The Tennessee statute at issue in the case authorized law enforcement 
to use “all necessary means to effect the arrest” of a criminal suspect that 
flees apprehension, so long as the officer has given notice of an intent to 
 
 
12 Id. 
13 Id. “If you comply with an officer’s orders, the chance of being involved in a shooting is minimal 
to none.” Id. 
14 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 4. Garner’s father brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for asserted violations of 
Garner’s constitutional rights. Id. at 5. 
21 Id. at 4. 
22 Id. at 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/7
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arrest.23 The Court conceded that the arresting officer in this case had acted 
under the authority of the statute and pursuant to the Police Department 
policy.24 The Court then evaluated the constitutionality, under the Fourth 
Amendment, of a law authorizing use of deadly force to prevent the escape 
of an apparently unarmed suspected felon. 
 The Court first established that apprehension by the use of deadly force 
is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.25 On the particular facts of this case, the Court held that “such 
force may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the 
officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant 
threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.26 In so 
holding, the Court rejected implicit assumptions in the defense’s arguments 
advocating for the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony 
suspects, whatever the circumstances. “It is not better that all felony 
suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate 
threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing 
to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”27 
The Supreme Court returned to the constitutionality of law 
enforcement use of force in Graham v. Connor.28 Like Tennessee v. Garner, 
this case involved a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.29 The plaintiff in 
Graham v. Connor was a diabetic.30 Feeling the onset of an insulin reaction, 
he asked a friend to drive him to a convenience store to buy some juice to 
counteract the reaction.31 Seeing a long line in the convenience store, the 
 
 
23 Id. at 4. The statute provided that “[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he 
either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.” Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Id. at 7. Under the reasonableness inquiry, the Court balances “the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental 
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Id. at 8. The Court further stipulates that “reasonableness 
depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried out.” Ibid. 
26 Id. at 3. The Court further held that law enforcement should give some warning prior to using 
deadly force to prevent an escape where feasible. Id. at 11-12. 
27 Id. at 11. 
28 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute states in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress…” 
30 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 388. 
31 Id. 
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two left the store in a hurry to find another place to acquire juice.32 A nearby 
police officer became suspicious when he saw the plaintiff and his friend 
hastily enter and exit the store.33 He pulled them over close to the store, and 
ordered the two to wait to determine whether the two had committed a crime 
at the convenience store.34 More officers arrived on the scene. During the 
encounter with law enforcement, the plaintiff lost and regained 
consciousness from the insulin reaction, and suffered multiple injuries at the 
hands of law enforcement.35 The plaintiff sustained a broken foot, cuts on 
his wrists, a bruised forehead, and claims to have developed a perpetual loud 
ringing in one of his ears.36 
On these facts the Supreme Court held that “[w]here, as here, the 
excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop 
of a free citizen, it is more properly characterized as one invoking the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right 
‘to be secure in their persons…against unreasonable…seizures’ of the 
person.”37 Echoing the analysis of Tennessee v. Garner, the Court made 
explicit that claims of excessive force should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard.38 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses 
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”39 Moreover, 
the Court emphasized that “reasonableness” in this context is an objective 
standard, to be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, and not with the benefit of hindsight.40 “The calculus of 
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is 
necessary in a particular situation.”41 The Court rejected the lower courts’ 
analysis of the subjective motivations of the individual officers, reasoning 
 
 
32 Id. at 388-89. 
33 Id. at 389. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 389-90. 
36 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 390 (1989). 
37 Id. at 394. 
38 Id. at 395.  
39 Id. at 396.  
40 Id. “The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 
41 Id. at 396-97. 
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that this has no bearing on whether a particular seizure is “unreasonable” 
under the Fourth Amendment.42 
Therefore, the use of deadly force that is objectively unreasonable 
constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Following Garner, many 
states modified their substantive criminal law to reflect the more restrictive 
standard on the use of deadly force by law enforcement.43 
 
B. Critics of the Prevailing State of the Law 
 Criticisms of the laws governing police use of deadly force as well as 
individual police officer’s decision to use deadly force are both numerous 
and diverse. A brief overview of the most prominent of these objections will 
help shape the analytical framework for law enforcement use of deadly 
force. 
 One of the most prominent criticisms regards the disproportionate use 
of deadly force on racial minorities and impoverished groups. “It is 
undisputed that Blacks are disproportionately represented among the 
victims of police shootings…nearly every study that has examined this issue 
[has] found that blacks are represented disproportionately among the wrong 
end of police guns.”44 
 Another criticism of the current state of law enforcement use of deadly 
force addresses the near-impossibility of obtaining convictions. For 
example, in Washington State, if a law enforcement officer kills a person 
while on duty, prosecutors are prohibited from seeking an indictment 
against her so long as she acted in good faith and without malice.45 But it is 
not only the law that minimizes the likelihood that a police officer will be 
prosecuted for an unjustified killing in the line of duty. There are also 
 
 
42 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
43 See Gillespie Mich. Crim. L. & Proc. Search & Seiz. § 5:60 (2d ed.) [“Garner means that the 
use of deadly force by the police without regard to dangerousness violates the Fourth Amendment, but, 
of course, the U.S. Supreme Court cannot change the state substantive criminal law, and this action 
would therefore not be a state law crime”] . 
44 Cynthia Lee, ‘But I Thought He Had a Gun’ – Race and Police Use of Deadly Force, HASTINGS 
RACE & POVERTY L. J. 1, 3 (2004). 
45  Steve Miletich Et Al., Shielded by the Law, THE SEATTLE TIMES, (Sept. 26, 2015), 
http://projects.seattletimes.com/2015/killed-by-
police/?utm_source=WhatCountsEmail&utm_medium=Company%20Updates&utm_campaign=%22S
hielded%20by%20the%20law%22%20Special%20Report. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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psychological explanations for this trend: research shows that police 
officers tend to garner sympathy among jurors.46 
 Yet another critique of the current state of the law concerns how 
legitimate objects of deadly force are distinguished from illegitimate objects 
of deadly force. Take the limited circumstance of the “fleeing felon.” Some 
states permit police to use deadly force to apprehend a person suspected of 
committing any felony. But these states prohibit using lethal force as a 
means of apprehending a person suspected of committing a misdemeanor. 
When behavior that constitutes a felony in one state constitutes only a 
misdemeanor in another state, problems arise. Indeed, what constitutes a 
felony in one state could in fact be legal conduct in another state.  
For example, in Colorado, possession of less than one ounce 
(approximately 28 grams) of marijuana is lawful.47 But in Florida, 
possession of more than 20 grams of marijuana is a felony.48 Law 
enforcement in Florida may use “any force necessary…when necessarily 
committed in arresting fleeing felons from justice.”49 Therefore, a person in 
possession of 21 grams of marijuana in Colorado is not engaged in any 
unlawful conduct, while in police in Florida would be justified to use deadly 
force upon that person in the event she chose to flee police apprehension. 
There is something worrisome about a circumstance in which a person does 
not break the law in one state, yet could be killed in another for the same 
conduct when they flee apprehension by law enforcement. 
C. Defenders of the Prevailing State of the Law 
 Police officers put their lives at risk every day they put on their 
uniform. They know the danger they face, and yet they choose to accept the 
risk inherent in their line of work. Critics of the current state of the law that 
advocate for altogether abolishing a police officer’s ability to use deadly 
force in the line of duty face a very real pragmatic hurdle: who would want 
to be a police officer if the law prohibited law enforcement from using 
deadly force when they objectively believed their life to be in danger? Those 
that advocate for a complete prohibition on the use of deadly force by law 
enforcement inevitably must accept an unsavory consequence: that by 
 
 
46 Kimberly Kindy and Kly Kimbriell, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, (April 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-
few-prosecuted/. 
47 Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16. 
48 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 893.03, 893.13. 
49 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.05. 
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2017]         A JUST WAR INQUIRY OF POLICE & DEADLY FORCE                   69 
 
 
 
 
becoming a law enforcement officer, an individual would give up the right 
to self-defense that they have when not wearing their uniform. A complete 
ban on the use of deadly force by law enforcement seems problematic at 
best, and at worst could endanger society. As long as the law permits 
widespread possession of guns by civilians and law enforcement alike, it is 
unclear whether armed criminals could be stopped by unarmed police 
officers. Further, defenders of the prevailing state of the law ask why 
someone is running from police in the first place. Implicit in this question 
is the premise that innocent people do not run from law enforcement.50 
III. JUST WAR THEORY APPLIED TO THE DOMESTIC REALM 
A. HISTORY AND NATURE OF JUST WAR THEORY 
Just war theory concerns the justification of how and why wars are 
fought.51 Just war theory is not a single theory but, rather, “a tradition within 
which there is a range of interpretation. That is, just war theory is best 
thought of as providing a framework for discussion about whether a war is 
just, rather than as providing a set of unambiguous criteria that are easily 
applied.”52 For the sake of simplicity, this Note adheres to the orthodox 
interpretation of just war theory, most notably put forth by Michael Walzer 
in his groundbreaking work Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With 
Historical Illustrations.53 
Just war theorists typically divide the moral reality of war into two 
parts: (1) the reasons states have for fighting, and (2) the means which such 
states adopt. The former is referred to as jus ad bellum, while the latter is 
known as jus in bello. Under the traditional approach to just war theory, jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello operate independently of one another.54 There is 
 
 
50 However, in light of recent studies concerning the criminal justice system’s apparent disparate 
treatment of minority groups, it could make sense why even innocent people would run from the police. 
So the assumption that innocent people do not run from police might be inconsistent with reality. See 
Jennifer Turner and Jamil Dakwar, Hearing on Reports of Racism in the Justice System of the United 
States, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, (Oct. 27, 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparities_aclu_submission_0.pdf. 
51 Alexander Moseley, Just War Theory, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2016) http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/. 
52 ANDREW VALLS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: THEORIES AND CASES, 68 (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000). 
53 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS (REV, Basic Books 2006). I will make minor deviations from the traditional approach 
to just war theory to more easily analogize the principles of war to the domestic realm, but these will be 
discussed later in the analysis. 
54 Just war theorists do not universally accept this proposition, and compelling arguments have 
been put forth that cast doubt on this assumption. However this is outside the scope of the present 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a third, less discussed dimension of just war theory that has unique 
application to the controversies surrounding law enforcement use of deadly 
force – jus post bellum. This concerns justice after the termination of an 
armed conflict, and will be expanded upon in greater detail. 
The just war framework relies on several key concepts that have a 
technical definition contrary to their plain meaning. The term "innocent" 
has at least three different meanings in the just war literature. These 
meanings include: (1) a person that is not a legitimate target of attack; (2) a 
person that is morally innocent, or not guilty or culpable; and (3) a person 
that is “‘currently harmless,’ and opposed not to ‘guilty’ but to ‘doing 
harm.’”55 Another way of understanding these three meanings of innocence 
is through a series of dichotomies: (1) legitimate targets of attack vs. 
illegitimate targets of attack; (2) morally culpable vs. morally innocent; and 
(3) currently doing harm vs. currently harmless.  
The concept of innocence is closely related to the notion of a 
noncombatant. "In the reigning theory of the just war, to be innocent in the 
generic sense of having done nothing to lose one's right is also to be innocent 
in the sense given by etymology--that is, to be unthreatening or harmless."56 
A noncombatant is someone who, in the context of warfare, does not pose 
a threat.57 It follows that a combatant is one that does pose a threat. 
Therefore, in traditional just war theory a noncombatant is an “innocent,” 
while a combatant is not. So, in just war theory, to say that an “individual is 
not innocent is not to say that he is guilty, that he deserves to die, that his 
life is less valuable, or that his death is less tragic. It is only to say that he 
has done something to meet the criterion for liability to attack…”58 
Also worth defining for the purposes of the present analysis are the 
interrelated concepts of permissibility, justification, and excuse. Hugo 
Grotius, one of the earlier theorists to write of the normative foundation of 
war, identified a critical distinction in how philosophers and academics use 
the concept of “permissibility.” In his more well-known work, De iure belli 
ac pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), Grotius explains that, in one sense, 
a permissible act is “that which is done with impunity, although not without 
a moral wrong,” while in another sense a permissible act is “that which is 
 
 
analysis. 
55 JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR, 9-11 (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
56 Id. at 11. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 695 (Jul. 2004) 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/papers/McMahanEthicsofKilling
inWar.pdf. 
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free from moral wrong, even if virtue would enjoin not to do it.”59 This 
distinction suggests an ambiguity between two categories of permissible 
acts: (1) acts that are morally wrong but excusable, and (2) acts which are 
morally acceptable, but perhaps not praiseworthy. 
 Contemporary just war theorist Jeff McMahan addressed the 
relationship between the concepts of permissibility, justification, and 
excuse in the war paradigm.60 “Acts that are permitted or justified have in 
common that they are not wrong. When an act is wrong but the agent who 
does it is not blameworthy, he or she is excused.”61 Thus, McMahan 
resolves the ambiguity Grotius identified in the nature of a permissible act. 
For the purposes of this analysis, then, a permissible act is “that which is 
free from moral wrong, even if virtue would enjoin not to do it,” while an 
actor is excused if the act “is done without impunity, but although not 
without a moral wrong.”62 According to McMahan, an act is justified “if and 
only if it is permissible in the circumstances and there is a positive moral 
reason to do it.”63 
 Characterizing an act as permissible or justifiable encompasses both an 
objective and a subjective dimension. An act is objectively permissible or 
justifiable “when what explains its permissibility or justifiability are facts 
that are independent of the agent’s beliefs.”64 Alternatively, an act is 
subjectively permissible or justifiable when “two conditions are satisfied: 
first, the agent acts on the basis of beliefs, or perhaps reasonable or justified 
beliefs, that are false, and, second, the act would be objectively permissible 
or justified if those beliefs were true.”65 
 With the key concepts adequately defined, the three dimensions of the 
just war tradition can be introduced. 
B. Jus Ad Bellum 
 Jus ad bellum refers to the moral rules that concern resorting to war. 
Traditional just war theory stipulates five conditions that must be satisfied 
 
 
59 Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, bk III, Ch. IV, in The Ethics of War 385, 425. “For 
sometimes it is said to be permissible (licere) which is right (rectum) from every point of view and is 
free from reproach, even if there is something else which might more honourably be done…In another 
sense, however, something is said to be permissible, not because it can be done without prejudice to 
piety and rules of duty, but because among men it is not liable to punishment.” Id. at <1>, <2>. 
60 JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
61 Id. at 111. 
62 Grotius, at 425. 
63 McMahan, at 110. 
64 JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 43. 
65 Id. 
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for the waging of war to be just: (1) just cause; (2) legitimate authority; (3) 
likelihood of success; (4) last resort and (5) proportionality.66 However, 
because the present analysis is focused on analogizing (1) killing in war to 
killing in the domestic realm, and (2) just resolution of an armed conflict in 
the international and domestic spheres, the jus ad bellum requirements will 
not be discussed in greater detail. 
C. Jus in Bello 
Jus in bello, or just conduct in war, restricts the means a soldier can 
use to achieve her objectives in the theatre of war. Jus in bello is generally 
viewed as embodying three principles: (1) discrimination; (2) 
proportionality; and (3) minimum necessity.67 The requirement of 
discrimination “holds that combatants must intentionally attack only those 
who are legitimate targets.”68 Traditional just war theorists posit that the 
criterion of liability to attack in war is simply posing a threat.69 Combatants 
pose a threat to one another, while noncombatants do not. Therefore, under 
orthodox interpretations of the jus in bello requirement of discrimination, 
combatants are morally liable to attack, while noncombatants are morally 
immune from attack. On this view the only legitimate targets of attack in 
war are combatants.70  
  Proportionality concerns how much force is morally appropriate. In 
general, a harmful action is appropriate if the harm it causes is less severe 
than the harm it seeks to avert. Proportionality can be further divided into a 
narrow sense and a wide sense. Narrow proportionality concerns the harm 
inflicted on those who were potentially liable to lesser harms. An action is 
narrowly proportionate if it is proportionate in relation to the potential 
liability of the individual being acted upon. Wide proportionality concerns 
the harm inflicted on those who were not liable to any harm at all.71 In other 
words, wide proportionality requires the harm that an act of war would 
foreseeably, but unintentionally, inflict on noncombatants not be excessive 
in relation to the act's expected good effects. 
International law codifies the proportionality principle. Article 51 of 
the 1977 Geneva Protocol I articulates a critical principle of the just war 
 
 
66 Moseley, supra note 61. 
67 McMahan, at 16-23. 
68 Id. at 16. 
69 Id. at 11. 
70 Id. Because a combatant is defined as one that poses a threat to another, the only persons that 
are legitimate targets of intentional attack are those that pose a threat to others.  
71 Id. at 21. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/7
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convention: the principle of noncombatant immunity.72 This principle 
forbids inflicting harm on noncombatants as either a means to an end or an 
end in itself. This is because under traditional just war theory, 
noncombatants have a right to not be deliberate targets of attack.  
There is also a third requirement, which is the requirement of minimal 
force; this is the in bello version of the requirement of necessity.73 However, 
the requirements of minimal force and narrow proportionality tend to blur 
together when considerations of probability and risk arise. “If, for example, 
attempting to incapacitate the enemy combatants would have a slightly 
lower probability of success than trying to kill them, or if it would be riskier 
for one’s own combatants, the issue arguably becomes one of narrow 
proportionality.”74 Conventional just war theory would find the use of 
deadly force under such conditions not disproportionate, and therefore 
permissible.75 
D. Jus Post Bellum 
 Jus post bellum concerns the principles regulating the termination 
phase of war. It provides a normative framework for what participants 
should do as they move to conclude a war. Analysis of how an armed 
conflict is resolved fairly is influenced by the aims for which a just war is 
fought. Central to a jus post bellum inquiry are the goals to be achieved by 
the settlement of the conflict. 
 Brian Orend argues that the just goal of a just war, once won, “must be 
a more secure and more just state of affairs than existed prior to the 
war…the aim of a just and lawful war is the resistance of aggression and the 
vindication of the fundamental rights of political communities, ultimately 
on behalf of the human rights of their individual citizens.”76 Walzer shares 
a similar sentiment, asserting that the overall aim of a just war is “‘to 
 
 
72 ADAM ROBERTS AND RICHARD GUELFF, EDS., DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1982), at 416. (available at  
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201125/volume-1125-i-17512-english.pdf). 
73 The requirement of minimal force is an intuitive notion and can be most readily discerned 
through a simple hypothetical: a soldier encounters an enemy combatant who poses a threat. Suppose 
the soldier can eliminate the threat with equal effectiveness by either killing the enemy combatant or by 
incapaciting the soldier without killing him. The requirement of minimal force demands the combatant 
be incapacitated instead of killed. It would be wrong to kill the combatant in these circumstances because 
the soldier could eliminate the threat through less forceful means. McMahan at 23. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Brian Orend, Justice After War, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 43, 45 (2002). 
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reaffirm our own deepest values’ with regard to justice, both domestic and 
international.”77 
 Orend draws heavily on the already established principles of the just 
war tradition to develop a set of principles to regulate what he calls an 
ethical “exit strategy” to an armed conflict.78 These principles are: (1) 
proportionality and publicity; (2) rights vindication; (3) discrimination; (4) 
punishment for war crimes, which can be distinguished into jus ad bellum 
crimes and jus in bello crimes; (5) compensation; and (6) rehabilitation.79 
E. Purpose of Applying Just War Theory to Domestic Realm 
There are two paradigms that justify lethal force: the war paradigm and 
the law enforcement paradigm. Therefore, the principles of just war theory 
are particularly applicable to the context of law enforcement use of deadly 
force because it provides a reasonable premise from which to begin: a peace 
officer should not be justified in the use of deadly force where a soldier of 
war is not. This is especially relevant when comparing a police officer 
contemplating deadly force on a fleeing felon, and a soldier contemplating 
the same on a fleeing enemy combatant.  Statutes governing the use of 
deadly force to apprehend a “fleeing felon” already embody the jus in bello 
principles.  
F. Jus in Bello Applied to Missouri’s Fleeing Felon Statute 
 The preceding analysis has identified three requirements fighting in 
war must satisfy in order to be just: (1) discrimination, (2) proportionality, 
and (3) minimal force. Up until now this framework has been applied 
exclusively in the context of war. But upon closer examination, it appears 
that many states’ approach to the conditions under which law enforcement 
is authorized to use deadly force actually embody the jus in bello principles. 
The jus in bello principles serve as an effective way to evaluate a state’s 
approach to law enforcement use of deadly force, particularly where key jus 
in bello principles are lacking. Examination of one state’s statute will 
demonstrate the veracity of this proposition. 
 Missouri addresses law enforcement use of deadly force in former 
section 563.046 of the Missouri Penal Code. 
 
 
77 Id., (citing Walzer, supra note 53, at 117). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 55-56. As many of these principles are uniquely applicable to the theatre of war, they are 
only mentioned in passing. 
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In affecting an arrest or in preventing an escape from 
custody, a law enforcement officer is justified in using 
deadly force only: (1) When such is authorized under other 
sections of this chapter; or (2) When the officer reasonably 
believes that such use of deadly force is immediately 
necessary to effect the arrest or prevent an escape from 
custody and also reasonably believes that the person to be 
arrested: (a) Has committed or attempted to commit a 
felony offense involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of serious physical injury; or (b) Is attempting to 
escape by use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; 
or (c) May otherwise endanger life or inflict serious 
physical injury to the officer or others unless arrested 
without delay.80 
  
As stated, the principle of discrimination requires that the person 
attacked must be a legitimate target of attack. In the context of war, the 
identification of a legitimate target of attack depends on an individual’s 
status as a combatant or noncombatant. Under Missouri’s statute, for a 
person to be a legitimate target of attack, it is necessary that the officer have 
a reasonable belief that the person has either already posed a threat to others, 
or will pose a threat to others in the future. Under the orthodox interpretation 
of just war theory, a combatant is one that poses a threat to others. Therefore, 
the requirement of discrimination in war perfectly parallels the requirement 
of discrimination under the Missouri statute. 
 However, an objection could be raised to this line of reasoning. The 
Missouri statute authorizes the use of deadly force to effectuate the arrest of 
a person that “has committed a felony offense involving the infliction or 
threatened infliction of serious physical injury.”81 It is questionable whether 
a person who has in the past posed a threat of harm to others therefore 
necessarily poses a threat of harm to others in the present. By definition, a 
combatant is one who poses a threat to others; implicit in the choice of 
phrasing is that the threat of harm is ongoing. Use of deadly force is meant 
to be instrumental; lethal force is used to prevent some greater harm from 
occurring. This challenge will be revisited later in the analysis. For now it 
is enough to flag the issue. 
 
 
80 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.046(3)(2016)(amended Jan. 1, 2017). 
81 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.046(2)(a). 
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 Next is the principle of proportionality. Under the Missouri statute, the 
requirement of proportionality is codified in the qualifying language of 
“infliction of serious physical injury” and “deadly weapon.”82 The statute 
defines “deadly force” as “physical force which the actor uses with the 
purpose of causing or which he or she knows to create a substantial risk of 
causing death or serious physical injury.”83 Therefore, “infliction of serious 
physical injury” implies a similar level of harm as that posed by deadly 
force. Thus, on a cursory examination, Missouri’s statute governing the use 
of deadly force by law enforcement seems to adhere to the requirements of 
discrimination and proportionality. 
 The final inquiry under the principles of just war theory involves what 
constitutes minimal force, the in bello requirement of necessity. At first 
look, the language of necessity appears to be contained within the statute 
(“when the officer reasonably believes such use of deadly force is 
immediately necessary”). However, the necessity of force is conditioned 
upon the reasonable belief of the officer. The reasonable belief of the officer 
depends, in part, upon considerations of probability and risk. As stated 
previously, where considerations of probability and risk arise, the principle 
of minimal force tends to blur with the concept of narrow-proportionality. 
Recall that an action is narrowly proportionate if it is proportionate in 
relation to the potential liability of the individual being acted upon. 
Therefore, if an officer had a reasonable belief that use of deadly force was 
“immediately necessary,” and this belief turned out to be mistaken, then the 
killing was narrowly disproportionate, and also violated the principle of 
minimal force. The principle of minimal force is violated where an officer 
mistakenly believes deadly force is necessary because deadly force was not, 
in fact, necessary. Such use of deadly force would violate the principles of 
just war theory, but is deemed justified under the Missouri statute.  
Thus, while Missouri’s statute governing law enforcement use of 
deadly force is consistent with the principles of discrimination and 
proportionality, an in-depth examination reveals that the statute does not 
abide by the principle of minimal force. Rather, a more accurate conclusion 
is that Missouri’s statute acknowledges the importance of using minimal 
force, but does not create an absolute prohibition against using greater force 
than may actually be necessary, if the officer possesses a reasonable belief 
that deadly force is in fact necessary.  
 
 
82 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.046(2)(a)-(c). 
83 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.011(1). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
2017]         A JUST WAR INQUIRY OF POLICE & DEADLY FORCE                   77 
 
 
 
 
 The preceding analysis demonstrates that the jus in bello principles 
are applicable to state law regulating law enforcement use of deadly force. 
Moreover, these principles provide an effective framework to evaluate the 
law’s normative force. 
IV. JUS POST BELLUM APPLIED TO PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE 
CALIFORNIA MODEL 
 The foregoing section applied the jus in bello dimension of the just war 
tradition to law enforcement use of deadly force. While most analyses of 
police use of deadly force focus on the conditions when police officers 
should use deadly force, comparatively little has been written about what 
prosecuting agencies should do following a deadly force incident. I respond 
to the latter inquiry by articulating a normative theory of what prosecuting 
agencies should do after investigating a police officer’s use of deadly force, 
with particular emphasis on the decision not to seek indictment of the officer 
involved. Using the just post bellum principles, I will demonstrate why 
justice requires more than simply deciding whether to seek an indictment, 
and why the California Model should be emulated by prosecuting agencies 
across the nation. 
 First the California law governing police use of deadly force will be 
articulated. Next, the California Model will be developed. The strength of 
the California Model will be demonstrated by analyzing one case in which 
a police officer used deadly force on an unarmed individual, and the 
prosecuting agency made the decision not to seek indictment. Regardless of 
whether one agrees with the outcome of this particular use of force, the 
value of the California Model lies in its ability to promote transparency and 
accountability in the law enforcement apparatus. The California Model 
expands the discourse of law enforcement deadly force, empowering the 
public to make educated and informed decisions about the justice of 
decisions to forego a criminal prosecution. 
A. California Law Governing Law Enforcement Use of Deadly 
Force 
 California’s law governing the use of deadly force by law enforcement 
officers is codified in California Penal Code section 196 (“Justifiable 
Homicide Statute”).84 The statute states, in its entirety: 
 
 
84 Cal. Ann. Pen. Code § 196. 
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Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers 
and those acting by their command in their aid and 
assistance, either— 
1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent Court; or, 
2. When necessarily committed in overcoming actual 
resistance to the execution of some legal process, or in the 
discharge of any other legal duty; or, 
3. When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have 
been rescued or have escaped, or when necessarily 
committed in arresting persons charged with felony, and 
who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest.85  
 
The California courts’ interpretation of section 196 deviates from the plain 
meaning of statute.86 Subsection (3) addresses the use of deadly force to 
apprehend a fleeing felon. 
The plain language of Penal Code section 196(3) would justify a 
killing to prevent any felony but, “in light of the large number of relatively 
non-serious felonies, this defense has been limited to those felonies which 
are ‘forcible and atrocious.’”87 The justification codified in 196(3) applies 
to peace officers, or others acting at their direction in apprehending 
dangerous felons. Dangerous felons are those persons who either: (1) pose 
a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to others, or (2) who 
have committed a forcible and atrocious felony.88 
In California, the evaluation of the reasonableness of a police officer’s 
use of deadly force employs a reasonable person acting as a police officer 
standard.89 
 
 
85 Id. 
86 See e.g. Kortrum v. Alkire, 69 Cal.App.3d 325, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (finding deadly force 
may be used on felony suspects only if the felony is a ‘forcible and atrocious’ one); People v. Ceballos, 
12 Cal.3d 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); People v. Piorkowski, 41 Cal.App.3d 324, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). 
87 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING 
OF HECTOR MOREJON (2016), 9. See Kortum v. Alkire,  69 Cal.App.3d 325, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) 
(“the California Penal Code, as construed by the courts of this state, prohibit the use of deadly force by 
anyone, including a police officer, against a fleeing felony suspect unless the felony is of the violent 
variety, i.e., a forcible and atrocious one which threatens death or serious bodily harm, or there are other 
circumstances which reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or another”). 
88 Foster v. City of Fresno, 392 F.Supp.2d 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that, under California 
law, an officer may use deadly force to effect an arrest “only if the felony for which the arrest is sought 
is ‘a forcible, and atrocious one which threatens death or serious bodily harm, or there are other 
circumstances which reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or to 
another.’”) See People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal.3d 470, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). 
89 People v. Mehserle, 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1146 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that California 
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B. The California Model For Just Resolution of Law Enforcement 
Use of Deadly Force 
In Los Angeles County, California, the Justice System Integrity 
Division (JSID) of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office 
(LADA) investigates all police involved shootings. The primary objective 
of JSID is “to accurately, thoroughly, and objectively investigate all relevant 
evidence and to determine the potential criminal liability, or lack thereof, of 
any party” in the context of a police-involved shooting.90 When a police-
involved shooting has occurred, a JSID investigator is immediately 
dispatched to the scene in order to investigate. While the investigating law 
enforcement agency has the primary responsibility of conducting a 
thorough, objective, and professional investigation of the incident, the 
District Attorney’s Office has the authority to conduct an independent 
investigation.91 The objective of this investigation is twofold: to determine 
whether the use of force was justified, and if not, whether there is sufficient 
evidence to bring charges against the law enforcement officer for the 
unlawful use of force. The investigating agency submits all relevant reports 
regarding the incident to JSID as soon as possible, usually within 60 to 90 
days.92 These reports include statements from witnesses, interviews with the 
officers involved, physical evidence, etc. JSID then reviews and analyzes 
the evidence to determine whether the officer acted lawfully. The JSID 
prosecutor applies the law governing police use of force to the facts of the 
case, and makes a decision whether to initiate criminal proceedings against 
the officer.  
If the investigating prosecutor determines either that the use of force 
was justified, or that they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
use of force was unlawful (as is their burden for charging any individual), 
there are two expected consequences. The first is that LADA will not initiate 
criminal proceedings against the officer involved. The second is that JSID 
will release a report, “summarizing the results of the investigation and 
 
 
law “follows the objective ‘reasonable person’ standard – the trier of fact is required to evaluate the 
conduct of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position [citations omitted]…the jury should consider 
all relevant circumstances surrounding the defendant’s conduct. This enables the jury to evaluate the 
conduct of a reasonable person functioning as a police officer in a stressful situation – but this is not the 
same as following a special ‘reasonable police officer’ standard.”) 
90 Protocol for District Attorney Officer-Involved Shooting Response Program, LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (2014), available at  
http://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/policies/JSID%20DART%20Protocol%202014.pdf. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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analyzing the evidence…[and] address[ing] the question of whether or not 
there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer, deputy, or any other 
person committed a crime.”93 Included in the report is a statement of JSID’s 
determination, either that the use of force was justified, or that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of 
force was unlawful. There is a description of the facts surrounding the use 
of force, shown by the statements provided by any witnesses to the shooting. 
There are also statements provided by the law enforcement officers involved 
in the incident (including those that did not use force but were merely 
present). The forensic evidence and autopsy conducted are also included 
when available. The next section is the Legal Analysis. This section 
includes all the relevant law governing police use of force that is applicable 
to the specific use of force under scrutiny.94 The relevant law is then applied 
to the facts of the case, demonstrating why the use of force was justified or, 
in the alternative, why there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the use of force was unlawful. The report ends with a 
summation of the analysis of the overall circumstances surrounding the 
officer’s use of force, and an explanation of the reasons why LADA decided 
not to indict the officer involved. This report is then made readily accessible 
to the public.95  
The level of transparency and accountability these reports represent is 
precisely what is needed to address the growing distrust and perceived 
illegitimacy of law enforcement agencies held by many citizens in 
contemporary America.96 The reports themselves support this proposition, 
as the recent shooting of Hector Morejon in Los Angeles County illustrates.  
 
 
93 Id. 
94 For instance, if JSID determines the use of force was a lawful defense of others, the legal analysis 
section will begin with a statement of California’s law governing the justifiable use of force for self-
defense and the defense of others. 
95 A link to these reports is available on the home page of the LADA website: 
http://da.co.la.ca.us/reports/ois. 
96 One way of understanding how transparency and accountability restore trust and legitimacy in 
the law enforcement apparatus is to understand these values as essential components to a fully 
functioning democracy. Jeff Rosen, the District Attorney for Santa Clara County, emphasized the 
importance of such reports in his own office during a speech at the University of Santa Clara. “In those 
cases where the officer did not commit a crime, I issue a very detailed report because I think that, in a 
democracy, people are, of course, entitled to disagree with their elected officials. People disagree with 
me from time to time, and they let me know about their disagreement. And that’s how it should be in a 
democracy. But I think everyone is entitled to this information. And the same information that I reviewed 
in deciding whether or not to file charges against an officer in a fatal shooting situation is the information 
that I then release to the public.” Jeff Rosen, Santa Clara County District Attorney, Remarks at a panel 
held at Santa Clara University on Race, Justice, and Ethics (Oct. 21, 2015), available at 
https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/government-ethics/resources/role-of-prosecutors-in-officer-
involved-shootings/. 
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C. Officer Involved Shooting of Hector Morejon 
 To demonstrate both the breadth and depth of analysis contained in the 
officer-involved use of force reports, it is necessary to examine one. This 
particular report is one of only a few cases currently available where police 
did not recover a weapon from the scene and where LADA made the 
decision not to seek an indictment of an officer who used deadly force. The 
individual killed in this event was Hector Morejon.97 The following 
statement of facts and legal analysis is meant to summarize the contents of 
the report, but is by no means as robust and exhaustive as the report itself. 
1. JSID: Statement of Facts 
On April 23, 2015, Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) received a 
report that 11 individuals broke into 1148 Hoffman Avenue and were 
vandalizing the interior of the residence.98 1148 Hoffman Avenue is 
“claimed” by the Eastside Longo criminal street gang and is known for 
violent activity.99 LBPD Officers Jeffrey Meyer and Xavier Veloz 
responded to the area to investigate possible trespassers.100 There were four 
units at the location, all of which were being remodeled, and appeared 
unoccupied.101 Three of the four units were locked and unoccupied. Unit 
1150, however, had a partially broken window on one side of the unit, and 
a partially open window on another side of the unit.102 A bicycle was visible 
through the partially open window.103 To conduct further investigation 
inside Unit 1150, officers contacted the property management company.104 
A representive of the property management company was dispatched to 
unlock the front door of Unit 1150. 105 
While Veloz waited for the representative to arrive, Meyer went alone 
to walk around the perimeter of unit 1150.106 On the north side of the unit, 
 
 
97 For a complete understanding of the subtleties and nuances of this case, I highly recommend 
reading through the report. The complete report is available at: 
http://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/JSID_OIS_09_2016_Morejon.pdf. 
98 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING 
OF HECTOR MOREJON 2 (2016). 
99 Id. at 1. 
100 Id. at 2. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON 2 (2016). 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
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Meyer was not visible to Veloz.107 Here, Meyer saw a broken window, and 
noticed two overturned five gallon buckets beneath the window.108 Meyer 
un-holstered his service weapon and approached the window.109 Meyer did 
not announce his presence, identify himself as a police officer, or notify 
Veloz of his intentions to investigate the interior of the unit.110 
Meyer’s written report following the incident stated the following 
facts. Meyer lifted the vertical blinds covering the window to look inside.111 
His head and part of his shoulder were exposed while he looked inside.112 
Meyer put his firearm through the window and used the flashlight attached 
to the firearm to illuminate the interior of the residence.113 While scanning 
the interior, Meyer saw the profile of a Hispanic male wearing a grey 
shirt.114 This individual was later identified as Hector Morejon. Meyer wrote 
that Morejon turned quickly to his right while “simultaneously turning at 
me and raising and extending his right arm in my direction in one 
movement.”115 Meyer further wrote that he saw a “dark object” protruding 
from Morejon’s hand and saw Morejon take a “firing stance.”116 Meyer then 
fired his service weapon one time.117 Meyer stated that he fired because he 
feared Morejon was armed with a firearm and was about to shoot him.118 
Meyer explained that he discharged his weapon without ever identifying 
himself as a police officer “because of how fast everything was 
happening.”119 After firing the single shot, Meyer retreated from the 
window, and returned to his partner, Veloz, to notify him that he had just 
fired his weapon.120 
Numerous police officers responded to the scene.121 Five individuals, 
including Morejon, exited the residence and were detained by law 
enforcement.122 Morejon had suffered a single gunshot wound to his torso. 
 
 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON 2 (2016). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113  Id. 
114 Id. at 3. 
115 Id. 
116 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON 3 (2016). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 5. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
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He was transported to a nearby hospital where he underwent surgery and 
later died.123  
Law enforcement searched the interior of 1150 Hoffman Avenue.124 
While a significant amount of graffiti was found inside the residence,125 no 
weapon was located.126 
 An autopsy of Morejon’s body concluded the gunshot wound caused 
his death.127 The medical examiner opined that the bullet entered the left 
side of Morejon’s back and exited his right upper abdomen.128 Thus, the 
corresponding bullet path was left to right and back to front.129 
 Officer Meyer was interviewed one week after the shooting by 
representatives of LBPD’s homicide division.130 LADA representatives 
were not present during the interview. At the outset of the interview Meyer 
was informed that the bullet’s entrance wound was to Morejon’s back.131 
Meyer responded by saying that Morejon was facing him when he fired. 
Meyer explained Morejon was in the process of turning towards Meyer at 
the time that he fired.132 Meyer stated that once he saw Morejon turning, he 
released the blinds with his left hand and started to back up to move behind 
the exterior wall for protection.133 Meyer admitted he did not really see 
Morejon’s body position as he fired,134 but believed Morejon was facing 
him.135 Meyer believed he shot Morejon in the front and “that’s what he was 
aiming for.”136 
 Law enforcement officials interviewed the three other trespassers who 
were present when Meyer shot and killed Morejon. Two of these individuals 
presented a consistent explanation of the events: they arrived several hours 
 
 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON (2016), 5. 
123 Id. at 3. 
124 Id. 
125 The unit was tagged with gang graffiti, including Morejon’s gang moniker (“Dynamite”). 
126 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON 3 (2016). 
127  Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 It is important to note that this was a non-compelled, voluntary interview. Interviews can be 
compelled where an officer refuses to voluntarily submit to an interview. 
131 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON 5 (2016). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 This is inconsistent with Meyer’s written report, where he stated that the male Hispanic he saw 
inside the residence (Morejon) was taking a “firing stance” when Meyer fired. 
135 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON, 5 (2016). 
136 Id. 
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before the shooting, they were both asleep prior to the shooting, and they 
were awoken either to the sound of a gunshot or to Morejon’s own screams 
after he was shot. They both smelled burnt gunpowder in the room. Several 
minutes after they woke up, they exited the residence and were detained by 
police. These individuals were interviewed the same day as the shooting.137 
 The third individual, Edgar Rodarte, was a more complicated witness. 
He was interviewed on three separate occasions, and he gave inconsistent 
statements throughout. During the first interview on April 25, 2015, Edgar 
was adamant that he did not see Morejon holding anything in his hands 
immediately prior to the shooting, and that Morejon did not turn toward the 
kitchen window immediately prior to the shooting.138 Edgar also stated that 
that the two other trespassers in the residence with him were in fact fully 
awake before the shooting, contrary to their own statements to law 
enforcement.139 A member of LADA was present during this interview. 
 Edgar was again interviewed on September 25, 2015. However, no 
member of LADA was present. This time Edgar stated that the two other 
trespassers in the residence with him were asleep prior to the shooting.140 
Of greater significance is that Edgar conceded during this interview it was 
“possible” Morejon had a glove in his hand at the time of the shooting.141 
Edgar also stated that Morejon turned and pointed just before he was shot.142 
Following the September 25 interview, Edgar participated in a video 
reenactment of Morejon’s movements immediately prior to being shot.143 
Edgar demonstrated how Morejon turned from facing the back of the unit 
while simultaneously pointing with his right hand.144 
 Edgar’s final interview occurred on May 6, 2016. This time a member 
of LADA was present. Unlike the first two interviews, this one was tape-
recorded.145 At the time of the interview, Edgar was serving a sentence for 
an unrelated crime in county jail.146 The report makes explicit that Edgar 
was not promised or given any reduction in his sentence or any other benefit 
 
 
137 Id. at 2-3. 
138 This is inconsistent with both Officer Meyer’s written report of the incident and his subsequent 
interview. 
139 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON, 6 (2016). 
140 Id at 7. 
141 Id. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON, 7 (2016). 
146 Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
2017]         A JUST WAR INQUIRY OF POLICE & DEADLY FORCE                   85 
 
 
 
 
in exchange for being re-interviewed.147 
 Edgar was confronted with the inconsistencies between his first two 
interviews. The critical inconsistences were: (1) whether the two other 
trespassers were fully awake before the shooting; (2) whether he saw the 
muzzle flash when the firearm was shot; and (3) Morejon’s actions just prior 
to the shooting. As to the first inconsistency, Edgar explained that the two 
other trespassers were not awake before the shooting. Edgar admitted he 
attempted to conform his statement during the interview on September 25 
to the statements given by the other trespassers on April 23, 2015.148 
 As to the second inconsistency, Edgar stated that he did in fact see a 
muzzle flash.149 He explained his failure to relate that he saw the muzzle 
flash during the first interview might have been the result of his having used 
drugs prior to the shooting and being shaken up by the incident.150 
 Concerning Morejon’s actions just prior to the shooting, Edgar was 
unable to cogently provide an explanation for the marked inconsistencies 
regarding Morejon’s movements immediately prior to being shot.151  
However, he affirmed his recitation of the facts contained within the 
September 25 video reenactment as an accurate reflection of his memory of 
the events that took place.152 
At the end of the third interview, Edgar denied that anybody tried to 
influence him to change his statements between the first and second 
interviews.153 He also stated that no one tried to influence him to change his 
statement prior to being re-interviewed on May 6, 2016.154  
The preceding constitutes an example of the universe of facts with 
which JSID determines whether it will seek an indictment of the officer 
involved in the shooting.  Rather than the investigation taking place behind 
a veil, obfuscating inner workings of the law enforcement apparatus from 
the public eye, JSID’s report empowers citizens to examine the facts of a 
given case, and provides them with an opportunity to understand how JSID 
reached its conclusions. 
 
 
147 Id. at 8. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON, 8-9 (2016). 
152 Id. at 9. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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2. JSID: Legal Analysis 
While the report’s fact section permits a reader to gain a robust 
understanding of a particular incident, the legal analysis section permits a 
reader to understand the law governing the use of deadly force by police 
officers in California. This in turn makes the law more accessible to the 
community, a worthy goal in its own right. A summary of the legal analysis 
provided in the JSID report follows. 
In California, murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human 
being with malice.155 The elements of murder are: (1) a person was killed; 
(2) the killing was unlawful; and (3) the killing was done with malice 
aforethought; or (3a) the killing occurred during the commission or 
attempted commission of a listed, or an inherently dangerous felony.156 
A killing which is legally justified is a lawful killing.157 The use of 
deadly force is justified, not unlawful, when the killer actually and 
reasonably: (1) believes there is an imminent danger that the other person 
will kill him or cause him great bodily injury and, (2) believes that it is 
necessary to use deadly force to avoid death or great bodily injury.158 Thus, 
California law permits the use of deadly force in self-defense if it reasonably 
appears that the person claiming the right of self-defense actually and 
reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of great bodily injury 
or death.159 
A killing which is partially justified is unlawful but does not constitute 
murder. A partially excused killing will support a charge of voluntary 
manslaughter when the killer harbored an actual but unreasonable belief in 
the need for self-defense.160 
Evaluating a police officer’s reasonable use of deadly force employs a 
reasonable person acting as a police officer standard.161 The right of self-
defense is the same whether the danger is real or apparent.162 
Under California negligence law “pre-shooting circumstances might 
show that an otherwise reasonable use of deadly force was in fact 
 
 
155 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON, 9 (2016); Cal. Pen. Code § 187. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 9-10 (citing People v. Randle, 35 Cal.4th 987, 994 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). 
160 Id. at 10. 
161 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON, 10 (2016) (citing People v. Mehserle, 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1146 
(2012)). 
162 Id. at 11 (citing People v. Toledo, 85 Cal.App.2d 577 (1948)). 
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unreasonable,” and a peace officer’s “pre-shooting conduct is included in 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding an officer’s use of deadly force 
and therefore the officer’s duty to act reasonably when using deadly force 
extends to pre-shooting conduct.”163 However, even if a police officer 
negligently provokes a violent response, that negligent act will not 
transform an otherwise reasonable use of responsive force into a Fourth 
Amendment violation.164 In Billington v. Smith, the 9th Circuit held that if 
the police intentionally or recklessly provoke a violent response and their 
provocation is an independent constitutional violation, then such reckless 
pre-shooting conduct may render the police subsequent use of defensive 
force unreasonable under the 4th Amendment.165 Therefore, under a 
constitutional analysis, the prosecution would need to prove that (1) Meyer 
intentionally or recklessly provoked Morejon’s actions; and (2) that 
Meyer’s provocation was an independent constitutional violation, in order 
to introduce Meyer’s pre-shooting tactical deficiencies to rebut Meyer’s 
contention that his decision to shoot was reasonable under the 
circumstances.166 
Additionally, an officer’s failure to warn a suspect, when feasible, can 
be factored into the evaluation of the objective reasonableness of the 
officer’s decision to use force.167 
3. JSID: Conclusion 
Perhaps the most significant part of the JSID report is the conclusion. 
First, the author of the Morejon report acknowledges that there was no 
serious crime committed that required an immediate and forceful police 
intervention. This is supported by three important facts: (1) the nature of the 
call Officers Meyer and Veloz responded to; (2) the information officers 
obtained from their initial investigation of the location; and (3) Officer 
Veloz’s actions after completing the initial reconnaissance of the premises. 
As to the nature of the call, Officer Meyer responded to a trespassing call 
with possible vandalism. This hardly poses the sort of life endangering 
criminal conduct requiring an immediate forceful response. Next, despite 
the fact the area the officers responded to is “claimed” by the Eastside 
 
 
163 Id. (citing Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal.4th 622, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)). 
164  Id. (citing Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
165 Id. at 14 (citing Billington, 292 F.3d at 1190-91. 
166  Id. at 14. 
167 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON (2016), 11 (citing Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 831 (9th Cir. 
2010)). 
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Longo gang, Officers Meyer and Veloz did not encounter any gang activity 
in progress. Finally, the conduct of Officer Veloz reveals that the alleged 
criminal conduct posed no exigency. After completing their investigation of 
the premises, the officers had concluded the unit that was unlawfully 
occupied was 1150 Hoffman Avenue. The property management company 
had been contacted, and a representative was on the way to open the front 
door of the premises. 
 In light of these facts, the author of the report concludes, “Given the 
minor, non-exigent nature of the alleged criminality, a reasonable and 
appropriate police response was to wait for the property manger to 
arrive.”168 Officer Meyer’s response was not to wait for the property 
manager to arrive, but to covertly approach the window of the unlawfully 
occupied house. Meyer did this without his partner’s knowledge, and with 
his weapon drawn. The author of the report states that such a decision 
“cannot be tactically justified. There was no legitimate law enforcement 
reason for Meyer to escalate the danger to himself and the occupants inside 
the unit by placing himself in this tactically compromised position.”169 
Officer Meyer’s decision to arm himself and secretly approach the window 
increased the potential for a violent encounter without any legitimate 
reason.170 
 Despite suggesting the reasonable and appropriate police response was 
to wait for the property manager to arrive, and Officer Meyer’s decision not 
to engage in that “reasonable and appropriate police response,” the author 
of the report concludes that Officer Meyer “actually or honestly believed 
that he was in imminent danger at the time he fired.”171 Edgar’s 
statements172 and those provided by Officer Meyer himself support this 
conclusion.173 Officer Meyer stated that the reason he fired his weapon was 
because Morejon turned toward him, raised his right arm, and then took a 
“firing stance.”174 While the author of the report acknowledges that “it is 
 
 
168 Id. at 12. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. The author goes on to write “It is unclear what response Meyer reasonably expected from 
the occupants of the residence in a known gang area upon being confronted with the muzzle of a firearm 
silently pointing through the window.” Id. 
171 Id. at 13. 
172 The author first casts doubt on Edgar’s veracity, pointing to his contradicting statements over 
the course of the three interviews he participated in. However, Edgar’s later statements corroborate 
Meyer’s contention that Morejon turned quickly with his arm outstretched immediately prior Officer 
Meyer’s decision to discharge his firearm.  
173 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON, 13 (2016). Officer Meyer was consistent in both his written statement 
and his voluntary interview. 
174 Id. 
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illogical to assume that Morejon would point at Meyer with nothing in his 
hand, particularly if all that was visible protruding through the window was 
the barrel of a firearm,” the author goes on to state that “there is no direct 
evidence to contradict Meyer’s perception that Morejon was pointing 
something at him.”175 
 In light of the universe of evidence surrounding this use of deadly 
force, the author concludes that the evidence suggest Morejon made some 
turning movement with his hand extended just before Meyer fired. Because 
there is no evidence to suggest Meyer fired for any reason other than his 
perception he was in imminent danger, the author concludes that he actually 
and honestly believed he was in imminent danger at the time he fired. 
Therefore, his “actual and honest belief prevents prosecution for murder.”176 
 The remainder of the report addresses the issue of whether Meyer’s 
belief in the need for self-defense was objectively reasonable. There are two 
distinct dimensions to this issue: a state law negligence analysis, and a 
constitutional analysis under the Fourth Amendment. The success of both 
the negligence claim and the constitutional claim hinge on the admissibility 
of Meyer’s pre-shooting tactical failures.177 If admissible, these failures 
could subvert Meyer’s claim that at the time he fired it was reasonable to do 
so. 
 For the constitutional analysis, “the People would have to prove that 
Meyer intentionally or recklessly provoked Morejon’s actions and that 
Meyer’s provocation was an independent constitutional violation, in order 
to introduce Meyer’s pre-shooting tactical deficiencies to rebut Meyer’s 
claim that his decision to shoot was reasonable.”178 In this context, the term 
“reckless” is an extremely high bar that “requires both a knowledge that 
one’s conduct creates a high risk of danger and [a] conscious decision to 
engage in the conduct despite the elevated risk.”179 
 The author of the report concedes that “clearly, Meyer’s tactical 
deficiencies were a substantial, if not the primary cause of Morejon’s death. 
In essence Meyer’s negligent tactical failures created the situation which 
 
 
175 Id. There is an open question whether the autopsy, which demonstrated that Morejon was shot 
in the back, would constitute direct evidence that contradicts Meyer’s perception that Morejon was 
pointing something at him. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 14. 
178 Id.; see Billington, 292 F.3d at 1190-91.  
179 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON, 14 (2016). “[C]onduct which creates not only an unreasonable risk 
but also a ‘high degree’ of risk (something more than mere ‘unreasonable’ risk) may be termed ‘gross 
negligence,’ and if in addition the one who creates such a risk realizes that he does so, his conduct may 
be called ‘recklessness.’” 
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then prompted him to use deadly force.”180 However, in light of the 
recklessness standard, the difficult question is whether Meyer’s decision to 
enter the breezeway alone, arm himself and surreptitiously peer through the 
kitchen window without announcing his presence was reckless given the 
totality of the circumstances.181 
 The author of the report does not give a concrete answer to this 
question, but acknowledges the possibility that Meyer’s actions were 
reckless given the totality of the circumstances. However, even assuming 
Meyer’s conduct was reckless leading up to the shooting, the author notes 
that under the prevailing law, Meyer’s actions preceding the shooting are 
admissible only if they also constitute a separate constitutional violation.182 
However, as described elsewhere, Meyer’s actions preceding the shooting 
do not constitute a separate constitutional violation. Thus, “because the 
People would be unable to establish the separate constitutional violation 
required by Billington, the evidence of Meyer’s pre-shooting conduct would 
be inadmissible to rebut the argument that Meyer’s decision to fire was 
objectively reasonable in a prosecution of Meyer for voluntary 
manslaughter.”183  
Without the evidence of the pre-shooting conduct, the author 
determines that the remaining evidence supports the conclusion that 
Meyer’s decision to fire was not objectively unreasonable under the 
circumstances.184 While the author acknowledges “Meyer’s failure to give 
Morejon any opportunity to submit to police authority is deeply troubling,” 
and further expresses “serious concern about Officer Meyer’s tactical 
decisions prior to the shooting,” a prosecutor is obligated to apply the law; 
and “the state of the law prevents the introduction of Meyer’s pre-shooting 
conduct to directly rebut the reasonableness of Meyer’s decision to use 
lethal force.”185 As such, because the evidence is insufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt Meyer’s actions were criminal, the report 
concludes with a statement that LADA declines to initiate criminal 
prosecution in this matter.186 
 
 
180 Id. at 14. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 15. The author explains that trespassers, like Morejon, do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the spaces they are unlawfully occupying. See People v. Satz, 61 Cal.App.4th 
322, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Because Meyer could not have violated Morejon’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy where none existed, Meyer’s conduct did not constitute a separate constitutional violation. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 15-0201, OFFICER INVOLVED 
SHOOTING OF HECTOR MOREJON (2016), 15-16. 
186 Id. at 16. 
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D. Analysis of JSID Report 
What can a layman glean from the officer-involved shooting report? 
They can obtain a robust understanding of the facts surrounding the 
shooting, significantly more than those available from a brief news article 
published after the shooting. The report also equips members of the public 
with the law that governs police use of deadly force, including both the 
statutory language and the jury instructions explaining the law in terms 
more accessible than the usual legalese. They can see LADA’s reasoning 
when applying the law to the facts, and how the agency reached its ultimate 
conclusion that it could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing 
was unlawful. They could also see how this conclusion left the writer of the 
report with discomfort about Officer Meyer’s tactics.  
 Armed with this report, a reader can conduct their own review of 
LADA’s decision. They can first assess whether they agree with the 
conclusion reached by the JSID prosecutor who wrote the report. Even if a 
layperson agrees that, under the prevailing law, it could not be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of deadly force was not lawful, the 
layperson is empowered to pass value judgments over the prevailing state 
of the law itself. 
 The JSID report gives the community an opportunity to understand 
why a prosecutor has declined to seek indictment of the officer involved. 
This provides the public with the tools they need to make an informed 
decision as to whether they believe allegations of police misconduct are 
addressed fairly in practice. Members of the public can engage in a 
discussion about whether they agree with the prosecutor’s analysis.  A 
prosecutor who knows that their decision not to seek an indictment will be 
subject to intense public scrutiny will therefore be quite thorough in their 
explanation of why their decision not to pursue criminal charges is 
compelled given the prevailing state of the law. 
 Any compelling normative theory necessarily must be grounded in an 
accurate descriptive account. The JSID report is this accurate descriptive 
account. The JSID report empowers a layperson to look to the law 
governing the use of deadly force by law enforcement through a normative 
lens to determine whether the law, in practice, is precisely what it should 
be. 
E. Jus Post Bellum Applied To California Model 
 Recall that the guiding principle of the jus post bellum inquiry is to 
secure a more just state of affairs then existed prior to the conflict. The 
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California Model best conforms to the principles of jus post bellum guiding 
principle because of its ability to promote: (1) transparency of the law 
enforcement apparatus; (2) accountability, both of prosecutors and 
legislators; and (3) a political check on the prosecutor’s power not to charge. 
Each of these will be briefly addressed. 
1. Transparency  
The California Model promotes transparency of the criminal justice 
system. “[I]n communities where there is a lack of confidence between 
police and minority residences and a perception that complaints about police 
misconduct will not be addressed fairly, [a police officer’s use of force] 
can…easily lead to violent disturbances.”187 The most effective way to 
combat the perception that police misconduct will not be addressed fairly is 
to reveal the process by which police misconduct is addressed. The decision 
not to seek indictment of a police officer that uses deadly force, without 
more information as to why no indictment will be sought, only confirms the 
suspicion that police officers are above the law. Increasing the transparency 
of a prosecutor’s decision not to seek indictment of a police officer’s use of 
deadly force empowers a community to understand why criminal charges 
will not be sought.188 
2. Accountability  
The JSID reports provide the public with three critical pieces of 
information for evaluating a specific circumstance where a police officer 
uses deadly force: the facts of the case, the governing law, and the 
conclusion the prosecutor reached by applying the law to the facts. As a 
result, the community has the opportunity to understand why a prosecutor 
 
 
187 Police Use of Force: Addressing Community Racial Tensions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CMTY. 
RELATIONS SERV., https://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/policeuseofforce092003.html. 
188 California legislators have recently enacted another measure, SB 227, to promote transparency 
in the criminal justice system. In August of 2015, Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 227 into law, which 
prohibited grand juries from determining whether police officers in involved in fatal shootings should 
face criminal charges. Legislators believed that SB 227 would “help make judicial proceedings more 
transparent and more accountable.” Melanie Mason, Gov. Brown Signs Law Barring Grand Juries in 
Police Deadly Force Cases, LOS ANGELES TIMES, (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-brown-grand-juries-20150811-story.html. However, 
less then two years later, a California appeals court held the law was unconstitutional. See Court Tosses 
California Law That Barred Grand Juries From Investigating Police Shootings, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 
(Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-grand-jury-police-shootings-20170111-
story.html. 
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has declined to seek indictment of the officer involved. This provides the 
public with the tools they need to make an informed decision as to whether 
they believe allegations of police misconduct are addressed fairly in 
practice. Members of the public can engage in a discussion about whether 
they agree with the prosecutor’s analysis.  Additionally, a prosecutor who 
knows that their decision not to seek an indictment will be subject to intense 
public scrutiny has incentive to be thorough in explaining their decision not 
to pursue criminal charges given the prevailing state of the law. 
The California Model also promotes legislative accountability by 
providing the public with a robust understanding of the laws regulating 
police use of deadly force. If they disagree with the law, an informed public 
can call on their legislatures to modify it so that it more accurately reflects 
contemporary moral sentiments. A legislator that fails to heed the wishes of 
her constituents could jeopardize her aspirations for reelection. If the 
prosecutor is precluded from seeking indictments given the current state of 
the law, then perhaps “the public should instead hold the legislature 
accountable for failing to provide the prosecutor with the legal tools to 
charge officers with this type of offense.”189 
3. Political Check 
There is no judicial check on a prosecutor’s decision not to seek 
indictment in a given case.190 Publishing a declination report creates a 
political check on the prosecutor’s power (not) to charge. Publication of 
declination reports empowers the public to serve as legitimate oversight of 
prosecutorial decision-making. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement use of deadly force has come under close scrutiny, 
by the federal government, the media and the greater public. It is an 
emotionally charged topic, both for critics and defenders of the prevailing 
state of the law. It should come as no surprise that discussion among 
divergent viewpoints is often strained, at best.  
 
 
189 Jeri Neff, Article, A Pyrrhic Victory: Why California’s Grand Jury Law (Still) Won’t Hold 
Officers Liable for Murder, LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945695.  
190 See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d. Cir. 1973) (holding 
the Court could not force prosecutors to pursue criminal charges against prison guards who allegedly 
murdered inmates during a brutal prison uprising as such judicial review would violate the separation of 
powers doctrine). 
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 The discursive framework detailed above is not limited to the 
circumstances leading up to an officer’s decision to use deadly force, but 
encompasses the decision whether to initiate criminal proceedings against 
the officer involved. My goal was to craft a different way of thinking about 
the many controversies surrounding police use of deadly force. To that end 
I have advocated for the use of the just war tradition. Just war theory 
contains principles uniquely applicable to the context of state-sanctioned 
killing, both in the international and domestic spheres. I have demonstrated 
that a state law regulating police use of deadly force can be evaluated using 
the jus in bello principles of proportionality, discrimination, and minimum 
necessity. Analysis of the Missouri statute revealed that these values were 
already reflected in the law itself, though perhaps not to the degree 
demanded by the principle of minimum necessity. The language of jus in 
bello expands the discourse of police deadly force, providing a more 
objective way of discussing an often emotionally-charged topic for all 
interested parties. 
 The jus post bellum analysis is a particularly intriguing dimension of 
the just war tradition that has the potential to address many of the 
controversies surrounding police use of deadly force. Examining what steps 
a prosecuting agency should take following the decision not to seek an 
indictment could serve as an invaluable tool for restoring trust, faith and 
confidence in the law enforcement apparatus. Accepting the premise that 
the just aim of a just armed conflict is to attain a more secure and more just 
state of affairs then existed prior to the conflict,191 I advocate for prosecuting 
agencies to adopt the California Model when deciding not to seek the 
indictment of a police officer’s use of deadly force upon another. The 
strengths of the California Model lie in its ability to promote (1) 
transparency of the law enforcement apparatus; (2) accountability, both of 
prosecutors and legislators; and (3) a political check on the prosecutor’s 
power not to charge. Each of these strengths reinforces the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system and faith in the law enforcement apparatus. 
When a crime has been committed, society itself has been wronged. 
That is why criminal complaints proclaim “The STATE” versus the 
defendant. The prosecutor advocates on behalf of the public. Is it not 
 
 
191 One could object to the proposition that the aim of a just armed conflict involving a police 
officer is to attain a more secure and more just state of affairs then existed prior to the officer’s use of 
deadly force. I have advocated for the application of the just war framework to the context of police use 
of deadly force. An alternative premise for the aim of a just armed conflict could be proposed without 
undermining the use of the just war framework for analyzing controversies surrounding the discourse of 
deadly force by law enforcement. 
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reasonable to hold the prosecutor accountable to those she advocates for? 
Should not the representative be held to answer by those she represents? 
The California Model answers these questions in the affirmative, and 
promotes the just resolution of an armed conflict where a police officer uses 
deadly force. 
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